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Abstract 
Predictors of worrying and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) were com-
pared. First, variables related to a version of inner experience were examined. 
Specifically, we examined whether negative appraisals about worrying and 
emotions can be considered subfacets of the overarching construct of expe-
riential avoidance. Second, we examined the relative predictive power of re-
sponsibility to continue thinking (i.e., beliefs about the need for prolonged 
thinking about stressful problems), a construct relating worrying to problem- 
solving. In two studies, consistent predictors of worrying and GAD were neg-
ative metacognitive beliefs, fear of emotions, and responsibility to continue 
thinking, even after controlling for neuroticism in Study 2. Experiential avoid-
ance did not explain the independent variance in worry. The structural equa-
tion model that experiential avoidance explained negative appraisals about 
worrying and emotions did not fit the data well. Negative metacognitive be-
liefs evidenced strong predictive power, therefore, requiring particular atten-
tion in treatment. Nonetheless, fear of emotions and perceived need for per-
severative thinking are candidate additional components that deserve contin-
ued investigation. 
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1. Introduction 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) is a debilitating condition that is often re-
sistant to treatment. The cardinal feature of GAD is long-lasting, pervasive, and 
uncontrollable worrying (Andrews, Hobbs, Borkovec, Beesdo, & Craske, 2010). 
Although there is evidence showing the efficacy of cognitive behavioral therapy 
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(CBT) for GAD, there is clearly room for improvement (see Cuijpers, Sijbrandij, 
Koole, Huibers, Berking, & Andersson, 2014; Hanrahan, Field, Jones, & Davey, 
2013 for a meta-analysis) and further developments in knowledge about the eti-
ology of GAD, as well as in its treatment, are required.  
There are several theoretical models of GAD. For example, a review con-
ducted by Behar, DiMarco, Mohlman, & Staples (2009) discussed the avoidance 
model, the intolerance of uncertainty model, metacognitive model, emotion dy-
sregulation model, and acceptance-based model of GAD. These models are all 
multi-faceted, each taking into consideration multiple predictors in the etiology 
of GAD. Behar et al. reported that these models all share a common focus: the 
avoidance of inner experiences as at least one of the etiological factors of GAD. 
However, the interrelationship among etiological factors needs further elucida-
tion. Specifically, do interventions target sufficiently many etiological dimen-
sions, or would additional components produce incrementally beneficial thera-
peutic effects? Recent evidence indicates that the chronicity of GAD affects 
whether a focused single intervention or multi-faceted intervention is superior 
(Newman & Fisher, 2013). Then, what specific psychological processes should be 
targeted? Overall, there has been a dearth of empirical research comparing the 
different variables of the various models (for exceptions, see Stapinski et al., 
2010; Ruggiero et al., 2012). The study reported here addressed two theoretical 
questions about interrelationships among the predictors of GAD: the relative 
predictive power of factors reflecting the aversion of inner experiences and the 
relative predictive power of factors related to problem-solving.  
1.1. Relative Predictive Power of Factors Reflecting A Version of 
Inner Experiences 
Both the emotion dysregulation model (Mennin, Heimberg, Turk, & Fresco, 
2005) and the acceptance-based models (Roemer & Orsillo, 2002) consider the 
fear of emotions to be an important predictor, whereas the metacognitive model 
includes negative appraisals about worrying (Wells, 2000). The former two 
models have their roots in Borkovec’s avoidance model (Borkovec, Alcaine, & 
Behar, 2004), in which worry is considered a maladaptive strategy to suppress 
emotional arousal by verbal linguistic thoughts, as opposed to imagery. The 
emotion dysregulation model includes four components, namely, fear of emo-
tions, reduced clarity of emotions, reduced control over emotions, and heigh-
tened intensity of emotions. In contrast, the acceptance-based model emphasizes 
avoidance of inner experiences and reduced action in the valued direction in the 
etiology of GAD. Despite these differences, a link between fear of emotions and 
GAD has been reported in several studies (Buhr & Dugas, 2012; Mennin et al., 
2005; Roemer, Salters, Raffa, & Orsillo, 2005).  
In his metacognitive model, Wells (2000) proposed that both positive and 
negative beliefs about worry work in the development and maintenance of pa-
thological worry and GAD. Positive metacognitive beliefs are about the perceived 
utility of worry, and are thought to increase worrying about external events, or 
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noncognitive inner experiences. Negative metacognitive beliefs represent a view 
of worrying as uncontrollable and dangerous that can eventually lead to worry-
ing about worrying. There has been strong empirical support for the relationship 
between negative metacognitive beliefs and GAD, whereas the predictive power 
of positive beliefs on GAD symptoms is relatively weak (e.g., Hirsch, Mathews, 
Lequertier, Perman, & Hayes, 2013; Penney, Mazmanian, & Rudanycz, 2013).  
In the metacognitive model (Wells, 2000), negative views about worry and 
emotions are expected to function quite differently. Negative beliefs about wor-
rying are generally focused on uncontrollability and the possible harm of wor-
rying, whereas fear of emotions is thought to trigger worry in the first place. 
Thus we expect negative beliefs about worrying and emotions have an indepen-
dent relationship to worrying and to GAD symptoms. In addition, negative be-
liefs about worrying should have much stronger predictive power than fear of 
emotions, as the former are more directly related to intensified GAD symptoms 
(Wells, 2006). In contrast, the acceptance-based model (Roemer & Orsillo, 2002) 
considers that appraisals of worrying and emotions are subfacets of the over-
arching construct of experiential avoidance (i.e., aversion and avoidance of neg-
ative inner experiences in general). Therefore, it is expected that negative ap-
praisals about worrying and emotions function similarly, and as a result no dif-
ference in predictive power is expected between them. In addition, it is expected 
that experiential avoidance would largely explain the effects of negative meta-
cognitive beliefs and the fear of emotions on worrying. Finally, according to the 
acceptance-based model, experiential avoidance will be an overarching con-
struct, subsuming both negative metacognitive beliefs and the fear of emotions.  
Our first research question concerns the relative predictive power of negative 
beliefs about worry and the fear of emotions, and their relationship to experien-
tial avoidance. Roemer et al. (2005) found that worry and GAD symptoms (both 
clinical and non-clinical) were related to fear of anxiety, as well as to experiential 
avoidance. Buhr & Dugas (2012) found that the fear of emotions, experiential 
avoidance, and intolerance of uncertainty, all make independent contributions 
to non-clinical worry and the degree of GAD symptoms, whereas experiential 
avoidance exhibits relatively weak predictive power. Stapinski, Abbott, & Rapee 
(2010) included the fear of emotions and metacognitive beliefs, with other va-
riables such as intolerance of uncertainty, threat perception, and perceived un-
controllability of emotions in regression models. Their results indicated that 
metacognitive beliefs, together with threat perception and perceived uncontrol-
lability of emotions predicted the degree of both clinical and non-clinical wor-
rying. However, Stapinski et al. (2010) examined metacognitive beliefs as a total 
score, and did not specifically use the negative beliefs subscale as a predictor of 
GAD. To the authors' knowledge, the present study is the first to simultaneously 
compare the predictive power and directly examine the interelationships of ex-
periential avoidance, negative metacognitive beliefs, and the fear of emotions. In 
addition, we used structural equation modeling (SEM) to examine whether ex-
periential avoidance may serve as an overarching construct explaining both neg-
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ative metacognitive beliefs and the fear of emotions, or these three predictors are 
related but independent constructs.  
1.2. Relative Predictive Power of Factors Related to  
Problem-Solving 
Our second question concerns the role of problem-solving in worrying and 
GAD. In early scientific research, worry has been considered as an attempt to 
solve problems (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983). Such a view is 
reflected in items used to measure positive metacognitive beliefs about worrying 
(e.g., “Worrying helps me to solve problems”; Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004) 
and intolerance of uncertainty (e.g., “I should be able to organize everything in 
advance”; Freeston, Rheaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994). In addition, 
negative problem orientation, which includes dysfunctional attitudes toward so-
cial problem-solving (e.g., low confidence in problem-solving), is known to be 
related to GAD (e.g., Dugas et al., 2007). Finally, a recent initiation-termination 
(IT) model of worrying (Berenbaum, 2010), which aims to integrate many of the 
proposed predictors of worrying, includes components related to problem- 
solving. For example, delay or failure to engage in active problem-solving pre-
vents the termination of worrying, whereas goal investment is thought to lead to 
the initiation of worrying. Pomenrantz, Saxon, and Oishi (2000) found that goal 
investment and perceived effort for goals are related to worrying, as well as posi-
tive emotions.  
However, the relative importance of problem-solving compared to the aver-
sion of inner experiences, which is a process featured in many models (Behar et 
al., 2009), needs further elucidation. For example, in the avoidance model of 
Borkovec, Shadick, & Hopkins (1991), which emphasized the avoidance of emo-
tional arousal by worry, “worry as problem-solving” was viewed as a post-hoc 
attribution made by worriers. In his IT model, Berenbaum (2010) predicted 
that disinclination to solve problems mediates the effect of experiential 
avoidance and reduced emotional clarity on worry. Therefore, the relative 
predictive power of the factors related to problem-solving awaits empirical 
investigation.  
It is important to consider how to operationalize aspects of problem-solving 
most conducive to worrying. As noted above, problem-solving is reflected in 
multiple worry-related constructs, yet there are differences in the predictive 
power of different variables. For example, whereas the intolerance of uncertainty 
is a strong predictor (e.g., Dugas et al., 2007) of GAD, there is limited support 
for the predictive power of positive beliefs about worrying (Wells, 2006), al-
though in adolescents Thielsch, Andor, & Ehring (2015) found both positive and 
negative metacognitions predicted scores on the Penn State Worry Question-
naire (PSWQ), along with intolerance of uncertainty. A relatively new construct 
called responsibility to continue thinking (RESP; Sugiura, 2007; Sugiura, Sugi-
ura, & Tanno, 2013), which is the belief that one needs to engage in prolonged 
thinking about stressful problems, offers a promising candidate for our research. 
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First, RESP focuses explicitly on problem-solving such that items are rated with 
reference to the time that respondents are engaged in solving difficult problems. 
Secondly, RESP seems to capture some aspects of the IT model of worrying (Be-
renbaum, 2010), which places importance on the lack of a sense of closure (i.e., 
satisfaction that one has resorted to all the necessary means) and perseverative 
iterative style (i.e., tendency to repeat and continue a given chain of thoughts) in 
determining delayed termination of worry, and goal investment in the initiation 
of worrying, together with other factors. RESP items seem to reflect a reduced 
sense of closure (e.g., “I somehow feel that I have not thought enough about the 
problem, and I need to think through.”), perseverative iterative style (e.g., “I 
have to keep thinking about this problem over and over.”), and possibly goal in-
vestment (e.g., “I will make every effort to improve this situation.”). Sugiura, Su-
giura, & Tanno (2013) reported its incremental prediction over metacognitive 
beliefs. Sugiura (2007) demonstrated the incremental validity of RESP in pre-
dicting worrying over and above many other predictors (neuroticism, intoler-
ance of uncertainty, positive/negative metacognitive beliefs, poor problem- 
solving orientation, and cognitive avoidance). Nonetheless, because RESP is a 
relatively novel concept, evidence of its unique predictive power relative to 
aversion of inner experiences is required. However, to date, comparison of 
RESP with fear of emotions and experiential avoidance has not been con-
ducted.  
1.3. Aims of the Present Study 
In the present study, we addressed two questions regarding the relative predic-
tive power of multiple model factors. First, we compared factors reflecting a 
negative view of inner experiences. Two competing predictions are possible. 1) 
Negative metacognitive beliefs will have a stronger effect on GAD symptoms and 
worry than fear of emotions. 2) Experiential avoidance will explain the effect of 
negative metacognitive beliefs and the fear of emotions on GAD symptoms and 
worry. In addition we used SEM to examine two additional competing predic-
tions: 3) Experiential avoidance serves as an overarching construct explaining 
both negative metacognitive beliefs and the fear of emotions. 4) The three pre-
dictors are related but independent constructs.  
Second, we compared RESP to models related to an aversion of inner expe-
riences. As this is the first study that includes RESP, the fear of emotions, and 
experiential avoidance, it remains unknown whether RESP has independent 
predictive power among the present set of predictors.  
Study 1 compared fear of anxiety, negative beliefs about worrying, and RESP, 
in which both worrying and GAD symptoms served as dependent variables. Al-
though we focused on the prediction of dimensional GAD symptom severity, 
discriminant function analysis (DFA) was also conducted as a supplementary 
analysis in Study 1 to predict dichotomous GAD status by self-report measures. 
DFA yields linear combination of predictors to produce maximum discrimina-
tion of target groups. Predictors having high correlations with discriminant 
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functions are considered to contribute to the classification.  
Study 2 included experiential avoidance. In addition, neuroticism was also 
measured because studies have repeatedly demonstrated its relation to worry 
(e.g., Sexton, Norton, Walker, & Norton, 2003). Study 2 also included the fear of 
a wider range of emotions, although only worrying served as the dependent va-
riable. In addition, Study 2 conducted SEM to investigate interrelationships 
among experiential avoidance, negative metacognitive beliefs, and the fear of 
emotions. 
2. Study 1 
2.1. Method 
2.1.1. Participants 
Japanese college students (N = 390; mean age 19.39 years, SD = 3.46; 48% wom-
en) completed questionnaires during class in exchange for partial course credit. 
The study was approved by the institutional ethical review board. The nature 
and purpose of the study were explained to the participants. They were free to 
refuse participation in the study and they completed the questionnaires only if 
they agreed to participate in the study.  
2.1.2. Instruments 
The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Bor-
kovec, 1990) is a 16-item questionnaire (5-point scale). It has excellent psycho-
metric properties to measure the frequency and intensity of pathological worry. 
The Japanese version of the scale (Sugiura & Tanno, 2000) has psychometric 
properties comparable to those of the original version (Startup & Erickson, 
2006). In a student sample these properties included good internal consistency 
(α = 0.92), positive correlations with anxiety and depression, and the ability to 
discriminate between worry and obsessive symptoms. The Generalized Anxiety 
Disorder Questionnaire-IV (GADQ-IV; Newman et al., 2002) measures GAD 
symptoms defined by DSM-IV criteria. It can be used to compute dimensional 
symptom severity, and it can also yield dichotomous GAD status. Dimensional 
scores were used here. The original version of the GADQ-IV asks participants to 
skip questions about physical symptoms and distress if one has not been bo-
thered by excessive and uncontrollable worry on more days than not, during the 
last six months. This specification was removed here to focus on the continuous 
distribution of GAD symptoms (following the practice of Roemer, Lee, Salters- 
Pedneault, Erisman, Mennin, & Orsillo, 2009). The Japanese version of this scale 
developed by Takebayashi, Takagaki, & Sugiura (2012) has good reliability (α = 
0.85; test-retest ICC = 0.73) and convergent validity (correlation with worrying, 
trait anxiety, and intolerance of uncertainty) as compared with the original ver-
sion, in addition to a one-factor structure. Based on the original cutoff score of 
5.7, 34% of 322 college students were classified as possible candidates for GAD 
(Takebayashi et al., 2012). This proportion is similar to previous reports (e.g., 
33% in Turk, Heimberg, Luterek, Mennin, & Fresco, 2005), supporting the va-
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lidity of dichotomous classification using this measure.  
The Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire short form (MCQ-30; Wells & Cartwright- 
Hatton, 2004), which contains 30-item rated on a four-point scale, measures be-
liefs about worry and intrusive thoughts. The MCQ-30 has established psycho-
metric properties including its relationship to worrying. Sugiura, Sugiura, & 
Umaoka (2003) translated the 65-item full version of the MCQ (Cartwright- 
Hatton & Wells, 1997) into Japanese and confirmed the good reliability of each 
subscale (α = 0.83 - 0.89). Of the five subscales, the negative metacognitive be-
liefs subscale was used (6 items used in MCQ-30), with good reliability in both 
studies (α = 0.86).  
The RESP (Sugiura, 2005, 2007) reflects beliefs about the need for prolonged 
thinking about stressful problems. In this scale, participants rate 14 items on a 
5-point scale, as to how often they occurred while they were solving stressful 
problems. Sugiura (2005) reported adequate reliability (αs > 0.88) and validity of 
this measure, including its positive correlation with perfectionism and active 
problem-solving.  
The Affective Control Scale (ACS; Williams, Chambless, & Ahrens, 1997) 
measures negative appraisals of four emotions, namely, fear, depression, anger, 
and positive emotions. It has 42 items, each rated on a seven-point scale. The 
Japanese version has acceptable to good internal consistency and correlates with 
indices of maladaptive emotional regulation, such as reduced emotional clarity 
and avoidance of negative emotions (Kanetsuki, Kanetsuki, & Oikawa, 2010). 
Only the fear of anxiety subscale was used in Study 1 on the basis that of the 
subscales, fear of anxiety was most strongly related to GAD status/symptoms 
(Buhr & Dugas, 2012; Mennin et al., 2005; Roemer et al., 2005).  
2.1.3. Statistical Analyses 
A stepwise regression analysis was conducted to examine relative predictive 
power of etiological factors on worrying and GAD symptoms. In addition, DFA 
was used to examine their power to predict dichotomous GAD status. 
2.2. Results and Discussion 
As shown in Table 1, all scales had good to excellent reliability (α = 0.82 - 0.92). 
As expected, negative evaluations of worrying (MCQ negative beliefs) and an-
xiety (ACS anxiety) were positively correlated (r = 0.52; p < 0.001).  
All predictors were positively correlated with the PSWQ and the GAD-Q-IV 
(see Table 1). Because this study postulated multiple possibilities regarding the 
relative predictive power of variables in the model, rather than on the incremen-
tal validity of one particular variable over others, we conducted stepwise regres-
sion analyses, as shown in Table 2. Given the relatively large sample size, a sig-
nificance level of 1% (two-tailed) was used in the two studies. A variance infla-
tion factor (VIF) greater than 1.78 was not observed, suggesting no multicolli-
nearity (VIF > 10 is usually considered to represent a risk of multicollinearity). 
All three predictors (MCQ negative beliefs, ACS anxiety, and RESP) remained  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlation of study 1 variables (N = 390). 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(1) MCQ-Negative Beliefs 1.00 0.52 0.34 0.75 0.69 
(2) ACS anxiety  1.00 0.20 0.62 0.61 
(3) RESP  0.20 1.00 0.42 0.37 
(4) PSWQ    1.00 0.74 
(5) GADQ-IV     1.00 
 M 11.93 21.78 46.85 49.24 4.08 
 SD 4.10 7.74 9.60 12.21 2.70 
 α 0.86 0.82 0.87 0.92 0.83 
Note. MCQ = Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire short form; ACS = Affective Control Scale; RESP = Respon-
sibility to continue thinking; PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; GADQ-IV = Generalized Anxiety 
Disorder Questionnaire-IV. rs > 0.20 are significant at p < 0.001. 
 
Table 2. Stepwise regression analyses predicting worry (PSWQ) and GAD symptoms 
(GADQ-IV) (N = 390). 
Predictors 
Worry GAD Symptoms 
β β 
MCQ-Negative Beliefs 0.53*** 0.45*** 
ACS anxiety 0.26*** 0.30*** 
RESP 0.19*** 0.15*** 
R2 0.63*** 0.55*** 
Note. PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; GADQ-IV = Generalized Anxiety Disorder Question-
naire-IV; MCQ = Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire short form; ACS = Affective Control Scale; RESP = Re-
sponsibility to continue thinking. ***p < 0.001. 
 
significant in predicting both the PSWQ and the GADQ-IV, explaining 63% and 
55% of the variance, respectively. In both cases, negative metacognitive beliefs 
were associated with the largest beta (β = 0.53 and 0.45; p < 0.001).  
Prediction of GAD diagnostic status based on GADQ-IV (cutoff score of 5.7) 
was also conducted with the same set of three predictors. Using this cutoff point, 
26% (102 of 390 participants) were classified as potentially exhibiting GAD. The 
discriminant function was significant (Wilk’s λ = 0.66; p < 0.001), correctly clas-
sifying 59.8% of participants with GAD and 93.1% of participants without GAD. 
Negative beliefs about worrying was most strongly related to the discriminant 
function (r = 0.95), followed by fear of anxiety (r = 0.67), and the RESP (r = 
0.42). 
Both negative beliefs about worrying and emotions had independent predic-
tive power regarding worry and dimensional GAD symptoms, with the former 
acting as a better predictor. This is the first direct comparison of these two nega-
tive beliefs about inner experiences and is consistent with the prediction from 
the metacogitive model. In addition, the RESP indicated independent predictive 
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power over not only negative metacognitive beliefs, but also fear of anxiety. In 
addition, all three predictors were related to discrimination of GAD diagnosis 
via the GADQ-IV, whereas negative metacognitive beliefs had the strongest rela-
tionship to the discriminant function. However, a caveat here is the relatively 
high false negative rate in the DFA (40.2% of GAD candidates according to 
GADQ-IV were classified as non-GAD). However, this may be explicable on the 
basis that the present study employed a non-clinical sample.  
3. Study 2 
3.1. Method 
3.1.1. Participants 
Japanese college students (N = 371; mean age 18.78 years, SD = 2.17; 57% wom-
en) completed questionnaires during class. The same procedure as Study 1 was 
followed, including ethical considerations.  
3.1.2. Instruments 
In Study 2, MCQ-30 negative metacognitive beliefs were used as in Study 1. The 
ACS was used in its full form, including the four subscales for the fear of differ-
ent emotions. Measure of experiential avoidance and neuroticism were added. 
Only the PSWQ scores served as a dependent variable.  
The Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ; Bond & Bunce, 2003) is a 
self-report measure designed to assess experiential avoidance. Matsumoto & 
Ohkouti (2012) translated the measure, conducted factor analysis, and retained 
10 items (5 items for openness toward internal experience and 5 items for ability 
to take action even in the face of difficulty). Items were rated on a seven-point 
scale, with higher scores indicating the presence of higher levels of experiential 
avoidance. Both subscales of the Japanese AAQ demonstrated a relationship to 
avoidant coping, thought suppression, rumination, anxiety, depression, and 
general health. The total score was used as the measure of interest in this study. 
Internal consistency in the present sample was low to adequate (α = 0.60). 
Therefore, these results should be interpreted with caution.  
Neuroticism was measured using the Big Five Scale (BFS; Wada, 1996). Each 
of the Big Five factors contains 12 trait adjectives, each rated on a seven-point 
scale. All subscales showed good to excellent internal consistency (αs > 0.84), as 
well as content and factorial validity. The neuroticism subscale contains items 
such as nervous, feelings easily upset, and tense.  
3.1.3. Statistical Analyses 
A stepwise regression analysis was conducted to examine relative predictive 
power of etiological factors on worrying. In addition, SEM was used to investi-
gate interrelationships among experiential avoidance, negative metacognitive be-
liefs, and the fear of emotions. 
3.2. Results and Discussion 
As shown in Table 3, all scales, with the exception of the AAQ, evidenced good 
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reliability (αs = 0.81 - 0.93). While alpha for the AAQ was not good, as its rela-
tions to other measures were understandable, we retained in the following ana-
lyses.  
All predictors were positively correlated with worrying (see Table 3). As Ta-
ble 4 depicts, a stepwise regression analysis predicting the PSWQ was con-
ducted. A VIF greater than 2.47 was not observed, suggesting no multicollinear-
ity. All predictors remained significant, with the exception of experiential 
avoidance, with 79% of the variance explained. Of all the predictors, neuroticism 
had the largest beta (β = 0.45; p < 0.001), followed by negative metacognitive be-
liefs (β = 0.33; p < 0.001).  
To investigate the interrelationships among negative appraisals about emo-
tions, those about worry, and experiential avoidance, structural equation mod-
eling was conducted. Three latent variables were introduced: experiential avoid-
ance, fear of emotions, and negative beliefs about worrying. Fear of emotions 
was measured by the four ACS subscales. Because negative beliefs is a single  
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics and correlation of study 2 variables (N = 371). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Neuroticism 1.00 0.67 0.72 0.47 0.45 0.82 
MCQ-Negative Beliefs  1.00 0.68 0.53 0.44 0.78 
ACS total   1.00 0.49 0.53 0.74 
RESP    1.00 0.16 0.55 
AAQ     1.00 0.45 
PSWQ      1.00 
M 55.46 11.94 13.15 42.44 42.46 49.34 
SD 12.92 4.32 4.27 9.65 6.32 12.51 
α 0.91 0.86 0.81 0.87 0.60 0.93 
Note. MCQ = Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire short form; ACS = Affective Control Scale; RESP = Respon-
sibility to continue thinking; ACS = Affective Control Scale; RESP = Responsibility to continue thinking; 
AAQ = Acceptance and Action Questionnaire; PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire. rs > 0.16 are sig-
nificant at p < 0.01; rs > 0.24 are significant at p < 0.001. 
 
Table 4. Stepwise regression analysis predicting worry (PSWQ) (N = 371). 
Predictors β 
Neuroticism 0.45*** 
MCQ-Negative Beliefs 0.33*** 
ACS total 0.15*** 
RESP 0.09** 
R2 0.79*** 
Note. PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; MCQ = Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire short form; ACS 
= Affective Control Scale; RESP = Responsibility to continue thinking. **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. 
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subscale, items were alternately divided into two parcels (Little, Cunningham, 
Shahar, & Widaman, 2002). In addition, although experiential avoidance has two 
subscales, as their correlation was too small (r = 0.09; p < 10), we used the total 
AAQ score as a single manifest variable for the construct. The error variance 
term of the AAQ was fixed, computed based on alpha reliability.  
Two alternative models were compared. In the first, experiential avoidance 
was the overarching construct predicting both fear of emotions and negative be-
liefs about worrying. In the second, the three variables were related but inde-
pendent constructs. Table 5 depicts fit indices for two models. The root mean 
square error of approximation (RMSEA) was smaller for the related but inde-
pendent model, but its value of 0.12 suggests that even this model did not fit the 
data well. However, because our focus was the relative performance of the two 
models, we note that the comparative and non-normed fit indices were lower, 
and RMSEA higher, for the model using experiential avoidance as the overarch-
ing construct. The Akaike and Bayes information criteria are specialized indices 
for model comparison. Both indicated better fit for the related but independent 
constructs model. Therefore, fear of emotions and negative beliefs about worry-
ing cannot be considered a subfacet of experiential avoidance. 
Study 2 replicated Study 1 in showing independent predictions by both nega-
tive metacognitive beliefs and fear of emotions, with strong predictive power of 
the former. Furthermore, experiential avoidance did not account for the effect of 
negative metacognitive beliefs, fear of emotions on worry. In addition, experien-
tial avoidance, negative metacognitive beliefs, and the fear of emotions were re-
lated but independent constructs, that is experiential avoidance was not an 
overarching construct explaining the other two constructs in SEM. These results 
are inconsistent with the acceptance-based model, which considers the negative 
view of worry and emotions as subfacets of experiential avoidance. In contrast, 
the results lend further support to the metacognitive model, as negative meta-
cognitive beliefs evidenced the second strongest predictive power with respect to 
worrying. Independent predictive power of RESP was also shown over other 
predictors including neuroticism and experiential avoidance.  
4. General Discussion 
The first aim of this study was to examine whether multiple scales related to the 
aversion of inner experiences predicted GAD symptoms. Results indicated that  
 
Table 5. Fit indices for two alternative models of the interrelation of three construct re-
lated to negative reactions to inner experiences. 
Models CFI NNFI RMSEA AIC BIC 
Experiential avoidance as  
overarching construct 0.94 0.90 0.15 148.66 207.40 
Related but independent construct 0.96 0.93 0.12 107.75 170.41 
Note. CFI = comparative fit index; NNFI = nonnormed fit index; RMSEA = root mean square error of ap-
proximation; AIC = Akaike Information criterion; BIC = Bayes information criterion. 
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both negative appraisals about emotions and worrying exerted independent pre-
dictive power over each other, as well as over neuroticism and experiential 
avoidance. Negative metacognitive beliefs about worrying had a stronger influ-
ence on worrying and GAD than the fear of emotions. Consistent findings also 
emerged from a DFA, where negative metacognitive beliefs were most strongly 
related to the discriminant function, followed by fear of anxiety. In addition, we 
examined whether negative appraisals about worrying and emotions can be 
conceptualized as subfacets of experiential avoidance. SEM results indicated that 
these two kinds of beliefs cannot be considered simply as facets of aversion of 
negative inner experience. These findings are consistent with the metacognitive 
model, which considers negative metacognitive beliefs to be a proximal contri-
butory cause in the pathway leading to the development of GAD (Wells, 2006). 
However, strong inferences about temporal proximity await longitudinal ex-
amination.  
Although Stapinski et al. (2010) measured both metacognitive beliefs and fear 
of emotions, the investigators did not conduct a subscale-level analysis, and 
therefore did not focus directly on negative beliefs about worrying. Therefore, to 
our knowledge, our study represents the first direct comparison of negative me-
tacognitive beliefs, including fear of emotions and experiential avoidance. The 
present results suggest that negative beliefs about worrying require a particular 
focus and should not be simply considered as one of the manifestations of expe-
riential avoidance. The independent predictive power evidenced by fear of emo-
tions suggests that this variable might also be targeted in treatment.  
Experiential avoidance did not evidence incremental validity in the prediction 
of worrying. Evidence is mixed regarding its predictive power. Kashdan, Barrios, 
Forsyth, & Steger (2006) found that experiential avoidance mediated the effect of 
emotional regulation on anxiety, whereas Kollman, Brown, & Barlow (2009) 
failed to find a relationship between acceptance (reduced experiential avoidance) 
and worry/social anxiety. Buhr & Dugas (2012) found that experimental avoid-
ance exhibited weak predictive power relative to fear of anxiety and intolerance 
of uncertainty. This finding led Buhr & Dugas (2012) to speculate that experien-
tial avoidance is a generalized vulnerability factor, as opposed to a GAD-specific 
factor. However, in the present results, experiential avoidance did not serve as a 
superfactor of negative appraisals about inner experiences. The relatively low 
alpha reliability of the AAQ might have compromised its predictive value. Fu-
ture studies should consider the AAQ-II (Bond et al., 2011), which overcomes 
the internal consistency problems.  
Regarding the second question concerning the role of problem-solving in 
worrying and GAD, we compared responsibility to continue thinking to models 
related to an aversion of inner experiences. The incremental validity of the RESP 
was demonstrated. RESP was also related to the discriminant function predicting 
GAD status, albeit to a lesser degree than negative metacognitive beliefs and fear 
of anxiety. This suggests problem-solving is still important in worrying and 
GAD, although many current models emphasize a relationship to inner expe-
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riences (Behar et al., 2009). Buhr & Dugas (2012) considered that the ap-
proach-avoidance dilemma in GAD was reflected in their finding of independent 
predictions by both intolerance of uncertainty and fear of emotions. Wells 
(1995) noted metacognitive dissonance arising from the coexistence of both pos-
itive and negative beliefs about worrying. The present findings are also consis-
tent with such a dilemma. RESP includes continuing problem-solving related 
thoughts, and seems to reflect some components of the initiation-termination 
model (Berenbaum, 2010), namely, a sense of closure, perseverative-iterative 
style, and goal investment, rendering indirect support for the model. That is, 
worrying is thought to reflect continued thinking about problems with perceived 
insufficiency. The importance of continued thinking is understandable in light 
of the notion that the cardinal features of pathological worry are perseverance 
(Brosschot, Gerin, & Thayer, 2006; Ruscio, Seitchik, Gentes, Jones, & Hallion, 
2011). Finally, neuroticism evidenced strong predictive power for worrying in 
Study 2, which is consistent with prior findings (Sexton et al., 2003).  
The present study suggests that research and practice should focus on more 
specific factors (e.g., negative beliefs about worrying), rather than on a general 
umbrella construct (e.g., experiential avoidance). Considering recent findings of 
a lack of augmentation of CBT by emotion processing techniques (Newman et 
al., 2011), the present approach of searching for stronger predictors among spe-
cific candidate variables is recommended, rather than talking simply about 
“cognitions” or “emotions”. 
A first limitation of the present study is the reliance on a non-clinical popula-
tion, which may not generalize to those clinically diagnosed with GAD. Howev-
er, inclusion of a relatively large number of participants, and the use of the 
GADQ-IV in addition to the PSWQ, are strengths of this study, and there are 
evidence of continuity in the distribution of worry (Olatunji, Broman-Fulks, 
Bergman, Green, & Zlomke, 2012). A second limitation is that only self-report 
measures were used. Third, temporal relationships among process variables re-
main unclear when using cross-sectional data. Future longitudinal studies are 
required in order to examine the mechanisms underlying the relationship 
among predictors and GAD. Fourth, future studies should examine how fear of 
emotions leads to GAD psychopathology. Llera & Newman (2014) and Newman 
& Llera (2011) proposed that worry does not suppress emotional arousal, but 
rather enables individuals to avoid the experience of unexpected worsening of 
emotions by prolonging negative emotions. This model suggests reasons why 
people fearful of emotions may worry, and warrants further investigation. Fifth, 
while our Study 1 focused on fear of anxiety, and Study 2 included fear of four 
emotions, recent studies have found a role of fear of shame (Schoenleber, Chow, 
& Berenbaum, 2014) and anger (Fracalanza, Koerner, Deschenes, & Dugas, 
2014) in GAD. Therefore, beliefs regarding a variety of emotions should be taken 
into account, together with a fear of a sharp increase of the intensity of emo-
tions, in addition to reactions to emotions themselves (Llera & Newman, 2012). 
Sixth, studies involving clinical samples in a therapeutic context are necessary. 
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For example, metacognitive therapy first targets negative beliefs then proceeds to 
positive beliefs, which is thought to motivate worrying (Wells, 2000). A reduced 
fear of emotions may reduce over-reliance on worrying, and reduced responsi-
bility may reduce the motivation to continue worrying. Therefore, these va-
riables may be altered following treatment that targets the modification of nega-
tive beliefs. Finally, future studies should also examine the interaction between 
beliefs about problem-solving and actual problem-solving ability. Penney, Mie-
dema, & Mazmanian (2015) found verbal intelligence was positively related to 
worrying, and Gentes & Ruscio (2014) perceived performance impairments are 
due to elevated performance standards. 
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